Shadi Farahzadi is currently a PhD student at the London School of Economics (LSE). More details about her research can be found at her website.
Click here for Shadi’s job market paper Elevator Pitch.
Policymakers are deeply preoccupied with the prospect of long-term or permanent migration to their countries. In OECD countries, a significant portion of immigrants have embarked on their journey due to marriage (OECD, 2017). In the United Kingdom in particular, migration for marriage accounts for nearly a third of the entire immigrant population. This pattern of migration predominantly stems from the unions between British ethnic minorities and partners from their ancestral country of origin (Charsely, 2020). Groups categorized by high marriage migration usually have lower integration (see Figure 1). This remarkable phenomenon has not gone unnoticed, capturing substantial media coverage and dubbed “The Immigrant Superhighway.”
Figure 1: Marriage migration as a function of inter-ethnic marriage. Source: Census for England and Wales, 2011.
The UK government, following the example of several European countries, has enforced strict measures to regulate this trend. These include the implementation of a minimum income requirement, entry tests, and higher fees (Home Office, 2011), and curbing migration (Casey, 2016). These policies weigh disproportionately on the British Muslim community, where nearly 50% married someone from their country of origin. What sparks this unique trend? Marriage Migration is influenced by two main reasons: economic gains of migration and preferences of people for marrying within their culture. significant implications for policy-making, as policies can influence the cost of migration but cannot change individual preferences.
In my job market paper, I measure the key determinants of marriage migration by crafting a matching model that accounts for the possibility of migration. My research demonstrates that the economic gains does not drive the high Muslim marriage migration. Instead, my results suggest that members of Muslim communities in the UK opt to marry individuals from their home country because it is simply easier to find partners who share their ethnicity and religious beliefs.
A Matching Model
Understanding the marriage market isn’t straightforward. It is not just about who you like; it is also about convincing them that you are the best choice. If the person you want to marry is unique or popular, you might even sweeten the deal by doing more chores or other ways to make yourself more appealing. These are implicit prices in the marriage market. This idea is at the heart of the transferable utility model, introduced by Gary Becker in 1973 when he first applied economic methods to study marriage decisions. So, it is not just about one’s preferences; it is about the combined happiness of both people in the relationship.
In the marriage market, not all the invaluable traits are readily observable. Some unpredictable “taste shocks” – having a “spark”– play a role in shaping marital decisions. Without any distributional assumptions on the random taste shocks, the model is under-identified. I’m assuming that the taste shocks have extreme-value type one distribution. This transforms the model into a tractable two-sided logit framework, allowing me to explore main mechanisms of the marriage market in a convenient way.
Motivation of Marriage Migration in the Model
Why would someone who grow up in the UK marry someone from their country of origin? Imagine two British Pakistanis, Ali and Sarah. They want to decide who to marry. Ali grew up in a traditional religious family and cherishes his Pakistani culture. So, he really wants to marry someone with the same culture. His parents tell him that it is much easier to find a girl from Pakistan rather than finding another Pakistani in the UK. So Ali decides to marry someone from home country, because he can find someone from same ethnicity and religion easier. This is the effect of endogamy preferences in the model. Now imagine Sarah. Sarah is not religious and grew up embracing British culture. However, she has heard that friends who marry someone from Pakistan, can marry a high educated nicer person, because many Pakistanis like to migrate to the UK. So she can trade-off her British residency for a higher quality spouse. The higher this trade-off is, the higher economic gains of migration are. This is the effect of migration gains in the model.
Linking Model and Data
How can we tell what types of marriages people prefer more? Marriages that are more common tend to offer greater benefits to the individuals involved. Imagine most people marry within their own “groups”. The relationship between people who have married outside their groups, can indicate a strong love that goes beyond cultural boundaries. Therefore, by looking at relative share of local intra-marriages versus local inter-marriages, I can measure preferences for marrying within group. Then, by looking at share of outside marriages versus local marriages, and trade-offs, I can estimate gains from migration. Data that I am using is from Census for England and Wales in 2011. The nice thing about this data is that I observe both ethnicity and religion, so I can measure preferences for same ethnicity and religion separately.
Results
Estimated marriage surplus shows that people gain from marrying within religion the most, then marrying within ethnicity, then education. The primary driving force behind the notably high rate of marriage migration among Muslims in the UK is their preferences for endogamy rather than gains from migration. Only around 10% of the total 50% marriage migration rate can be attributed to migration-related factors for Muslims. Hence, the main reason behind substantial Muslim marriage migration isn’t economic gains, but rather the strong preference for shared cultural . This results don’t vary by gender.
Comparison with Other Religious Groups
When I compare Muslims to other sizable religious minorities, it becomes clear that Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs reap comparable utilities from marrying within their own ethnic and religious circles. Hence, the higher Muslim marriage migration seem to stem from their access to a broader pool of potential partners in their countries of origin. The size of the pool is a direct outcome of how strong connection with country of origin is. Muslims, who are relatively recent immigrants in the UK, have consistently chosen to marry individuals from their home countries. This enduring practice not only strengthens their cultural ties but also paves the way for connections between generations. In essence, it creates a “first generation within every generation,” as mentioned by David Goodhart (2014).
Implications for Policy
Policies that make marriage migration more expensive primarily affect “migration gains.” They might reduce the number of marriages abroad but won’t lead to a significant increase in inter-religious marriage. If it becomes harder for Muslims to marry partners from their home country, a significant number opt to remain single. Marriage migration policies therefore, would not necessarily foster increased integration of Muslims with other groups. Instead, they often curtail the benefits of marrying someone from their home country, leading to reduced well-being for Muslim communities.
